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their popular meanings?28 Furthermore, the settled law in this and
other jurisdictions is that an indemnity bond is construed strictly against
the party issuing it and in favor of the party purchasing it.20 Therefore,
by giving proportionate importance to all the facts, by recognizing the
clear distinction between false pretense and forgery, by looking more
closely to the intent of the contracting parties, and by applying the rule
of construction in regard to contracts of this nature, the Court might
well have allowed a recovery by the Bank on its indemnity bond because
of a loss effected by false pretense. It seems that the Court fell a little
short of the mark when it found a "falsely written" instrument, imme-
diately labelled the loss as the result of forgery, and concluded that it
was outside the coverage of the policy. It is conjectured that the Court
had a feeling that the Bank was grossly negligent30 in becoming en-
snared in the framework of S Street Dick Drawer's playhouse, and thus
it should not be allowed to recover.
The Court's decision denying recovery to Drawee Bank is inevitable
conceding that its finding of forgery is correct. But this finding is ques-
tioned; for while it is true that one may be guilty of forgery if he signs
an instrument and passes it as the instrument of another whose name
is identical, here the essence of forgery is not present because the case
is devoid of evidence that the checks were represented or purported as
being made by any other than Dick Drawer of S Street. However,
this Dick Drawer by false pretenses obtained money from the insured
Bank, and it should be allowed to recover on its indemnity bond.
BARBARA M. STOCKTON.
Racial Restrictive Covenants-Damage Recovery for Breach-
Shelley v. Kraemer Held Inapplicable
Since the United States Supreme Court ruled in Shelley v. Krae;ncrl
that state courts could not enforce racial restrictive covenants by injunc-
tion, there has been widespread speculation as to other methods whereby
8 In giving a construction to the terms in the policy, the court should seek the
usual meaning as it is employed in its common usage. Laird v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 2 Del. 216, 18 A. 2d 86 (Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1941) ; Royal Ins. Co.
v. Jack, 113 Ohio St. 153, 148 N. E. 923 (1925). In the latter case, the court
said: "We are constrained to give that construction to the word 'theft' that is
understood by persons in the ordinary walks of life, and not the definition given it
by the Kansas Court-one unknown to the laity." VANCE ON INSURANCE §279
(2d Ed. 1930) ; 13 APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §7384 n. 56 & n. 62
(1943).
2" 13 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 28, §7401 n. 1 (1943) ; 44 C. J. S. INSUR-
ANCE, §297(c) (1) et seq., and citations (1943).
20 It is elementary that liability attaches if the drawee bank disburses the de-
positor's money other than on the depositor's order, however carefully the bank
acted. 7 Air. JuR., BANKS §506 n. 10 (1937).
1334 U. S. 1 (1948).
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the effectiveness of the covenants could be maintained. 2  One suggested
sanction received judicial support when the Supreme Court of Missouri
held in Weiss v. Leaon3 that Shelley v. Kraemer did not preclude the
award of damages for breach of racial restrictive agreements, and re-
manded the case for trial on that issue.
Shelley v. Kraemer held that state court enforcement of a racial
restrictive covenant constitutes a violation of the equal protection of
the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but nevertheless held
that such covenants are valid.4 Commentators have been of the almost
unanimous opinion that it also forbids a state court award of damages
for breach of such covenants. 5 The court in Weiss v. Leaon argued
that "the general rule of the law of contracts is well settled that in cer-
tain cases a breach of contract will give rise to two remedies, one an
action at law for damages, the other a suit in equity for specific per-
formance." 6 They viewed Shelley v. Kraemer as merely -prohibiting
'For discussions of possible methods of avoiding or mitigating the effects of
the case, see Ming, Racial Restrictions and the 14th Amendment, 16 U. OF Cr. L.
REv. 203 (1948); Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate, 24 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 157 (1948) ; Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 224 (1949).
'225 S. W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1949).
'A valid contract is generally thought of as one which can be enforced in the
courts. Nevertheless, valid but unenforceable contracts are familiar in other fields
of law, e.g., where a suit for breach is barred by a Statute of Limitation because
of undue delay, and where an oral contract violates a Statute of Frauds which
requires certain types of contracts to be in writing to be enforceable. But there the
objectives causing their unenforceability are far different from the reasons which
make it unconstitutional to enforce racial restrictive agreements.
The propriety of holding a contract valid when it would be unconstitutional to
enforce that contract seems at least questionable. Certainly the precedents created
by the cases involving the above-mentioned statutes do not necessarily support such
a holding. Consider the following language from the decision of Von Hoffman
v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 552 (U. S. 1867), a case involving the impairment of the
obligation of contract section of the Constitution: "Nothing can be more material
to the obligation than the means of enforcement. . . . The ideas of validity and
remedy are inseparable, and both are part of the obligation... "
See the following: Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 224, 230 (1949); Crooks, The
Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GEo. L. J. 514, 524-525 (1949) ; Lathrop, The Racial
Covenant Cases, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 508, 525, 527 ("Most certainly he [Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson] did not mean to say that the covenant could be enforced by the
obtaining of damages.") ; Ming, op. cit. supra note 2, at 235; Scanlan, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 182-183; Note, 48 COL. L. Rav. 1241, 1244 (1948) ("A narrow view of
the doctrine of the case might limit it to contract cases and even there to cases in
which injunctive relief rather than damages were sought. . . . But such an argu-
ment would be hardly tenable.") ; Note, 17 U. oF ClN. L. Ra,. 277, 282 (1948).
' Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S. W. 2d 127, 139 (Mo. 1949).
The following are cases which denied injunction but did award damages for
breach of the agreements involved: Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E.
691 (1892) ; Bull v. Burton, 227 N. Y. 101, 124 N. E. 111 (1919) ; McClure v.
Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961 (1905); RESTATmaNmT, PROPERTY §528
(1944). See the critical discussion by Dean Pound in The Progress of the Law,
33 HAgv. L. Rav. 813, 820-821 (1920). It should be noted that in none of the
cases denying specific performance or injunction and awarding damages in lieu
thereof was the reason for denying the affirmative equitable relief sought the fact
that it would be unconstitutional for the court to enforce the contract.
Compare the following language from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 36 (1948) (companion case to
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the suit in equity, but as not affecting the action at law for damages. 7
It is clear that when the covenants are effectuated through voluntary
aderence to their terms by the parties involved there is no state action.
Questions of what is forbidden state action and its exact scope must
await further Supreme Court -decisions for complete demarcation, But,
to hold that the state enforces through injunction and does not enforce
by awarding damages is to create a distinction valid only in the sense
that the former may be more effective in accomplishing the unconstitu-
tional objective than the latter. Weiss v. Leaon operates to discourage
a breach of the covenant's terms by threatening a prospective vendor
with a pecuniary loss if he sells to one whom the covenant sought to
exclude. And this threat may be so deterring in effect that, for all
practical purposes, the result Shelley v. Kraemer sought to obviate will
remain a reality.
8
.W¥hen the state court awards damages for the breach of such a
covenant, the court lends its aid and authority to the consummation of
an otherwise incomplete individual act of discrimination. This consti-
tutes that intervention of the state court, supported by the "full panoply
of state power," 9 which lies within the proscription of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The following language of Chief Justice Vinson, uttered
over a year before the Weiss case, presents an apt answer to the prob-
lem which that case considered: "The Constitution confers upon no
individual the right to demand action by the state which results in the
denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals."'1
There is no reason to believe that Shelley v. Kraemer was bottomed
on legal theory alone. Pressing social problems, especially those in-
volving overcrowded housing and its many harmful consequences,." as
Shelley v. Kraemer, barring Federal court injunction): "An injunction is, as it
always has been, 'an extraordinary remedial process, which is granted, not as a
matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.' Morrison v.
Work, 266 U. S. 481, 490 (1924). In good conscience, it cannot be the 'exercise
of a sound judicial discretion' by a federal court to grant the relief here asked for
when the authorization of such an injunction by the States of the Union violates
the Constitution . . . and violates it, not for any narrow technical reason, but for
considerations that touch rights so basic to our society, that, after the Civil War,
their protection against invasion by the States was safeguarded by the Constitution."
"Had the Supreme Court acceded to pressure urging them to declare the
covenants void rather than merely unenforceable, the damage question never would
have arisen. A void instrument obviously cannot form the basis for any judicial
relief.
' Even conceding that the "valid but unenforceable" label pinned on the racial
covenants is tenable (see note 4 supra), both the reasons for their unenforceability
and the general tenor of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion urge the conclusion
that anything other than purely voluntary adherence to their terms is not permis-
sible. "You do not act voluntarily when to act otherwise your property would be
diminished by an execution issued by a court." Lathrop, op. cit. supra note 5, at
525. Also see Ming, op. cit. mpra note 2, at 217.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 19 (1948).
0 Id. at 22.
" Numerous studies have demonstrated beyond cavil the menace to health and
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well as state court denial to Negroes of the privilege of ownership and
use of land, influenced the decision of the Court.12
Hinging decisions on subtle casuistries will not produce a satisfac-
tory solution to problems in a field where experience more than ade-
quately demonstrates the necessity for measuring methods aimed at
discrimination by their consequences rather than by their form. Dis-
regarding the social and constitutional consideration which prompted
Shelley v. Kraemer, the Missouri court in Weiss v. Leaon has sought
to evade its responsibility with a distinction that is merely formal.
CHARLES L. FULTON.
Vendor and Purchaser-Duty of Vendor to Accept Assignee's
Notes and Mortgage
The defendant contracted to sell real property to the plaintiff's as-
signor. The contract stipulated that one-half of the purchase price
should be paid in cash and the remainder by notes secured by a deed
of trust, and that the seller would convey "to the purchaser, or assignee,"
upon the payment of the purchase price. The original purchaser as-
signed all of his rights under the contract to the plaintiff corporation,
of which he was president, and which tendered the cash and its own
notes and deed of trist. The defendant refused to accept the tender.
In an action for specific performance, held, nonsuit of plaintiff reversed.
The contention that such a contract necessarily imports that credit is
given alone to the person with whom the transaction is personally car-
ried out, thereby making it unassignable, is untenable in the absence of
adequate expression in the instrument against assignment or some
circumstances judicially recognizable dehors the agreement.'
Contracts for the sale of land or for the sale of merchandise are
generally assignable and entitle the assignee to specific performance. 2
However, the undisputed rule is that the vendee cannot by an assign-
ment of the contract compel the vendor to accept the credit of the as-
signee.3 Hence if the performance of the assignor is construed as being
morals, media for crime, delinquency, etc., which a policy of legalized ghetto
housing has caused. See, e.g., DRAKE AND CLAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS (1945);
Woo-Ra, NEGao PROBLEMS IN CITIES (1928).
1" While the opinion of the Court does not refer to the sociological reasons
urged by many who filed briefs as amici curiae, opposing the covenants, the de-
cision must be analyzed with regard to these pressures. The cases were not de-
cided by a court unaware of the results which racial residential segregation pro-
duce. See Crooks, op. cit. srupra note 5, at 519.
'Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N. C. 23, 51, S. E. 2d 916 (1949).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-57 (1943) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrS §1439A (Rev. ed.
1937).
'Nelson v. Reidelback, 68 Ind. App. 19, 119 N. E. 804 (1918) ; Rice v. Gibbs,
40 Neb. 264, 58 N. W. 724 (1894); Atlantic & N. C. R. R. v. Atlantic & N. C.
R. R., 147 N. C. 368, 61 S. E. 185 (1908) ; Golden v. Tentzen & Schneyer, 92 Pa.
Super. 202 (1927); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §419 (Rev. ed. 1937).
1950]
